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ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades, suicide bombings became quite common among some 
communities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, USA, and a few African and 
European countries. The modeling of reported suicide bombings has been the subject 
of a few studies, but the pattern of incidents turned out to be difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless, to uncover the bombing patterns in past incident locations is of major 
importance because it can improve social security and save human lives. The Capital 
city of Afghanistan, Kabul, has experienced on average around one suicide attack in 
every month since 2001. The overall objective of this study is to characterize the 
spatial and temporal patterns of suicide attacks in Kabul City. 
This research primarily used last 5 years descriptive spatial information on suicide 
attacks in Kabul that brought to public by some local and international news paper to 
generate geographic point data. Suicide attack location points and potential target 
group establishment point’s data analyzed separately to explore inherent spatial point 
pattern in terms of intensity and interaction. Finally it analyzed spatial tendency 
between suicide attack location points on target group establishment locations.  
It has been explored that both suicide attack locations that occurred from year 2006 to 
2010 within the urban habitat of Kabul and target group’s establishment locations are 
characterized by inhomogeneous intensity and clustered interaction pattern at 98% 
level of significance. Moreover, there is a tendency of choosing location for suicide 
attacks close to target group’s establishment location. Finally some interesting 
temporal characteristics of suicide attack incidences also presented in this study.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
A suicide attack is a pre-planned attempt from a suspicious person or group of people 
intended to kill others (specific target) sacrificing the attacker’s own life. Example of 
suicide attack attempts can be traced from more than 2000 years back in the history 
and some were treated as brave attempts of a great fighter, while he knew that he 
might die if he took the risk of war or attacking others, who might be stronger than 
him. Still there are debates in favour of or against this cruel activity. But practically 
this is always a brutal threat to all mankind, which kills or severely injures many 
innocent people and children from the surroundings of the indecent. 
Suicide bombings are rare yet extremely destructive events and responses to such 
events are even rarer, because they require forecasting methods for effective 
prevention and early detection (Brown et al. 2004). In the last two decades, this 
violent tactic became quite common among some communities in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, USA, and some African countries and even some 
European countries faced threat for terrorist showdown. Total 472 suicide attacks 
occurred in 22 countries of the world and killed more than 7000 people and wounded 
tens of thousands during the years 2000 – 2004 and around 80% of all suicide attacks 
occurred after September 11, 2001 since the year 1968 (Atran, 2006).   
In recent years the suicide attacks are one of the most commonly reported terrorism 
tactics which are very difficult in understanding and modeling for predicting 
prevention. The tracking and prediction of the suicide attacks are often misled by 
voluntary death of the attacker, use of very simple and cheap explosives, social 
motivation/hypnotization and participation of minor people, especially sometimes 
women and children (Brown et al. 2004). 
For a long time, many researchers have been trying to find out the pattern of suicide 
bombing throughout the world for improving social security and saving human lives 
using different statistical methods. However, very little success has been achieved on 
detecting potential suicide attacks prior to its incident with high accuracy due to many 
reasons. Crime has an inherent geographical property as it occurs at a particular place 
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Figure 2: A police bus, which was completely destroyed, 35 people killed and 
more than 30 people injured by a suicide attack in Kabul 
Source: BBC News, 17.06.2007 
 
 
Figure 3: People searching victims after a suicide attack struck the heavily 
guarded Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in Kabul. 
 
Source: Pajhwok Afghan News, 15.12.2009 
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The derived knowledge from the incident spatial pattern analysis could be used to 
plan for physical and strategic security measures to protect highly endangered Kabul 
people. This may also influence general Kabul people to avoid most suicide attack 
occurrence locations (high risk zone) and specific time intervals for choosing their 
every day travel route throughout the city. The use of danger zone information in 
daily route choice may also decrease the traffic density near the hotspots what might 
be an aid in reducing the level of threat in those locations. Moreover during any 
suicide attack in Kabul, a GIS based real time network analysis could be used for 
efficient transport of the wounded to the nearest hospitals for saving their lives.  
1.2 Objectives 
Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, has experienced on average more than one suicide 
attack in every month after fall of Taliban regime in 2001. The overall objective of 
this study is to focus on only spatial and temporal patterns analysis of suicide attacks 
in Kabul city from a viewpoint of geographical space. The study also intends to 
produce some sort of geospatial information as an aid to further modeling of suicide 
attack incidences in Kabul by emphasizing general people’s safety concerns. 
A number of specific objectives emerge from those general objectives: 
? To determine the spatial point pattern of suicide attacks locations in Kabul city 
from January, 2006 to December, 2010. 
? To determine the spatial point pattern of Government establishments, foreign 
embassies, military bases and major international offices which tend to be 
attraction of suicide attacks. 
? To examine the spatial relationship between suicide attack locations and 
locations of target groups establishments within urban habitat of Kabul city. 
1.3 Research Questions  
Following research questions emerged from the objectives of the study: 
? Is there any spatial dependence of suicide attack locations in Kabul city?  
? Is there any spatial dependence of target group establishments in Kabul City?  
? Is there any spatial relationship between suicide attack locations and target 
groups establishments?  
  5
1.4 Study Area 
1.4.1 Location and Extent of Kabul City 
The Kabul city is the capital and the largest city of Afghanistan. The centroid of 
Kabul is located at geographic coordinates of 34°31′ N, 69°11′ E  (the World 
Factbook, 2010), where the municipal boundary has lied within a rectangle with 
geographic coordinate values of 68° 53' 57.7788" W, 69° 29' 3.0732" E, 34° 39' 
20.6424" N and 34° 17' 40.1856"S. The average elevation of the city is about 1800m 
above the mean sea level (Afghan Network, 2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Location of the study area; 
`    Source:  
a. http://www.twizi.com/images/world_map_blue.png 
b. http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Provinces.aspx 
C. Kabul City: The Study Area 
b. Afghanistan A. Location of Afghanistan in the World 
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1.4.2 History and Importance 
Kabul is over 3,500 years old settlement where many empires had long fought over 
the city for its strategic location as well as for its importance as the trade routes of 
South and Central Asia (Dupree and Kohzad, 1972). The past glory and beauty of this 
city has been portrayed in many historic scripts, songs and poems where the great 
Moghal emperor Zahirudeen Babur wished to be buried in Kabul within his immense 
kingdom. Apart from its importance as an economic, administrative and cultural 
centre in the current time, the close proximity to Khyber Pass which is an important 
mountainous pass as a gateway between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Afghan Network, 
2010) and Salong-Pass which is a major gateway through Hindu Kush mountain range 
connecting northern region of Afghanistan added some extra importance to Kabul to 
be an international and regional business hub of Afghanistan.  
1.4.3 Physical Environment 
1.4.3.1 Topography  
Kabul has a vibrant and extraordinary physical environment for its location at an 
elevation of 1800m from mean sea level (Afghan Network, 2010) and surrounded by 
high mountains which gives an impressive lotus view from aerials. The overall 
topography of the city is undulated and some small to large size hills existed within 
the city area. Only mentionable stream is Kabul River, flowing through the centre of 
the city from west towards east. A hilly range composed of Tiger hill, TV hill, Kartae 
Parwan hill etc. divided the city into north-eastern and south-western part (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Aerial View of Kabul Topography 
Source: Base Data: Google Earth, 15.02.2011 
Tiger Hills 
TV Hill 
Karta Parwan  
Hills 
North-Eastern KabulSouth-Western Kabul
Kabul River 
North-Eastern KabulSouth-Western Kabul 
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1.4.3.2 Meteorology 
The climate of Kabul is semi-arid and strongly continental (Qazi, 2011a). On the basis 
of meteorological records between 1956 and 1983, Kabul experienced temperatures 
ranging from a mean monthly low of -7.10C in January to a mean monthly high of 
32.10C in July (WMO, 2011). On the other hand most of the precipitation observed 
during winter season but the highest precipitation was in April as 71.9mm and other 
months remained comparatively drier. (See Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Mean monthly temperature (variation border) and precipitation in 
Kabul (period 1956-1983) 
Source: WMO, 2011 
 
Intensive snow fall are often observed during cold winter from December to February 
which can be a big factor to influence temporal pattern and strategy of suicide attack 
in Kabul. 
1.4.3.3 Vegetation  
A very few deciduous type vegetation is found in Kabul in recent time. The people of 
Kabul claim that the city was much greener before the civil war started in 1978. Long 
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time war effect and frequent explosions at current time, use of earthen roads, and 
extensive use of adulterated fuel to old (majority of more than 10 years) motorised 
vehicles converted the city to one of the most dangerous air polluted habitat of the 
world. The visibility declined to less than 100 meter in recent years from unlimited 
before 1980s (Sediqi, 2010). Due to high elevation, scarcity of water, continental 
weather and continual political unrest with frequent use of explosives can give very 
little hope to revive the optimum vegetation required at Kabul in near future.  
1.4.4 Urban form and Land Use 
The ambient rigid mountainous topography influenced significantly the Kabul city to 
be fitted in a semi circular shape. The present municipality of Kabul has area about 
1030.5 square kilometers including some uninhabitable mountainous land. The city 
boundary is again subdivided into 22 police districts (AIMS, 2010). The size and 
shape of municipal/police districts varies extensively. The smallest district (District 1) 
consists of an area of only about 4.67 square kilometer and the largest district (District 
20) consists of about 143.58 square kilometer area. According to Kabul Development 
Plan 2008-2023, the developed areas are contained within an area of 291 square 
kilometer.  The city appears to be followed a traditional form of a mono centric 
(Single CBD) as well as concentric-radial pattern.  
It has been revealed that only 35% of the urban settlements in Kabul are authorized or 
planned and rest 65% is either squatter, or built on grabbed land or built on privately 
owned land but without proper authentication of Kabul Municipality (Gebremedhin, 
2005). The recent war that took place from 1978 – 2001 influenced a high rural-urban 
migration and mostly travelled towards the Capital and settled on freely available hill 
side stiff slope lands during a gap of proper management of city authority. This 
massive informal settlement without provisions of utility and proper access ultimately 
knock downed the urban service system, function and security.   
 
The current land use of Kabul city shows the administrative and commercial core 
(CBD) in located almost at the centroid urban settlement. The formal and high class 
residential areas are located in close proximity of the CBD. The informal residential 
areas are mostly occupied the surrounding hill and mountain slopes and low lands 
(See Figure 7). The Kabul international airport, national and international the military 
bases and compound of United Nations agencies are located little far and to the east of 
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Figure 8: Four regional roads spread out from Kabul 
 
1.4.6 Socio-economic Environment  
Kabul has about 2.8 million people and most of them are Muslims (Statistical 
Yearbook, 2008/09). There are many ethnic groups with their unique culture and 
traditions where Tajik, Pashtoon, Hazara and Uzbek are most famous. In present days 
they are living quite peacefully showing honor to each other’s tradition. Afghanistan 
has two official languages one is Dari which is very close to Persian and another is 
Pashto which is the mother tongue of Pashtoun people (Qazi, 2011b) 
 
1.4.7 Present Conflict and Threat  
Afghanistan has a long history of intense fighting between tribes, against invaders and 
between ideological groups. The country saw frequent dramatic takeover of the throne 
in last 30 years (http://www.afghan-web.com/history/chron/index4.html). Finally 
Mujahideen and its allies formed the government in 2002 after removing Taliban 
government. But the fight continued till now between Taliban militants and the 
government supported by international forces. Suicide attack has been seen as a major 
techniques adopted by displaces Taliban militants to effectively target the 
governmental and international strategic points and personnel. Tactically suicide 
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attack often takes place at public places as well as mass gathering place such as 
congested roads, markets/shopping complex, assembly, embassies, residential hotels, 
airports etc. and affects mostly the innocent civilians compared to their intended 
targets. All people of Kabul everyday goes out with no hope that he can come back 
after finishing their work at end of the day. This type of fear from death is affecting 
extensively the citizen’s mental health, trust, social bondage, amenity, economy and 
development of the country. The International Council on Security and Development 
(ICOS) researched on the Taliban advance and depicted all international and civilian 
casualties and kidnappings that have taken place on the basis of publicly available 
records from January 2008 to November 2008 in Kabul with proportional symbol in 
Figure 9 (ICOS, 2008). The map gives an idea of incident pattern comparative 
affected people of Kabul city though the research team did not mention corresponding 
numeric value of proportional explosion symbol used for civilian casualty in the map.  
 
 
Figure 9: Civilian casualties and kidnappings from January to November 2008 
Source: ICOS, 2008 
 
  12
1.4.8 Study Window  
Kabul has been selected for the study due to frequent experience of major suicide 
attacks targeting different strategic important locations and availability of information 
in the web media. We have selected only 360.318 square kilometer area within a total 
1030.5square kilometer municipal boundary. The study window/area covered mainly 
the settlement area (habitat) and excluded high mountainous-uninhabitable area 
considering the chances of suicide attacks occurrences. The study area boundary is 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The full content of this study has been arranged in five chapters. Chapter 1 covers the 
introduction to the study; chapter 2 elaborates the data used in this study. Chapter 3 
sketches the methods of the study. All the analysis and finding are discussed in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks and recommendation for 
further study. Beyond these all the commands and data spreadsheet are attached in the 
Annexes.  
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CHAPTER 2: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Variety of data that used in the research are derived from different sources. Most of 
the geographic data and location attributes of Kabul city and Afghanistan are 
collected from Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS). High 
resolution Aerial Photographs has been collected from Ministry of Urban 
development.  
Suicide Attack data for the maps and analysis was gathered from few public insurgent 
activity reports throughout the course of January 2006 to December 2010. These are 
only publicly recorded attacks that were available in different local and international 
news papers and other relevant records; the real number of the suicide attacks might 
much higher as all incidents did not enter to the public domain. 
2.2 The Base Map: Basic GIS Feature Classes 
A number of basic GIS feature classes that depicted in all the figures were mainly 
downloaded from Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) website 
database (AIMS, 2010). A list of GIS shapefile is given at Table 1 that were used to 
Geocode suicide attack points based on visual proximity assessment from the 
reference locations. 
Table 1: List of GIS Feature Data of the Study 
Data  Data Type Source and Creation Year 
City Boundary and district 
Boundaries 
Polygon Feature: 22 
municipality district 
boundaries of Kabul city 
ISAF, AIMS, 2005  
Road Network  Line Feature: digitized on 
IKONOS satellite imagery 
(2000-2002) at 1:5,000 
scale 
AIMS, 2005 
River Line Line Feature: digitized on 
IKONOS satellite imagery 
AIMS, 2005 
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(2000-2002) at 1:5,000 
scale 
Airport Point Feature Digitized on Aerial 
Photograph of year 2006 
Area names, Landmarks, Road 
Intersection and Education 
Institutes  
 
Point Feature: digitized on 
IKONOS satellite imagery 
(2000-2002) at 1:5,000 
scale 
AIMS, 2005 
Government Buildings:  
Ministries, Departments, 
Supreme Court and 
Presidential Palace) of 
Afghanistan in Kabul city 
Point Feature digitized on 
IKONOS satellite imagery 
(2000-2002) at 1:5,000 
scale. The accuracy of data 
may vary up to 30meter 
from the original building.  
AIMS, 2005 
Location of International 
Organization Establishments: 
Diplomatic Missions, United 
Nations and International 
Organizations in Kabul city 
Point Feature: collected 
with GPS and mapped at 
1:5,000 scale 
AIMS, 2005 
Urban Settlement Polygon Feature: part of 
Land use data created at 
1:5,000 scale on IKONOS 
image of 200-2002 
AIMS, 2005 
Beyond the above list the study team also used Google earth, Wikimapia and Russian 
topographic maps for understanding and knowledge building on environmental setup 
of every part of Kabul City.  Most of the geographic feature that described above is 
depicted in Figure 10.     
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Figure 10: Location of Government and International Establishments within Study Area Extent of Kabul City 
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2.3  Suicide Attack Location Points  (SALP) 
In total 64 major suicide attack locations were depicted based on proximity from reference 
locations described in different security reports and news websites. The accuracy level of 
some of the suicide attack location points may vary up to ±500m from these locations.  
2.3.1 Data Sources and Formats 
It was the most challenging part of this research. Collection of suicide attack information 
was not easy at all. The study team approached to many security companies and national 
(Afghanistan) and international defense departments but did not receive any fruitful 
response to get GPS points (x, y format of geographic coordinate values) or any other 
accurate data of suicide attack locations that occurred in Kabul city from January 2006 to 
December 2010. After waiting for a considerable time for the response from the authentic 
data developer like Security Companies, UN, ISAF, MOI etc, the study team decided to 
carry on the research based on secondary public information published on different news 
papers and some daily security reports prepared by some private security company 
(confidential sources) for some NGOs and international companies working in 
Afghanistan.  
News searching was carried out with some key words like: Suicide Attack, VBIED, 
BBIED, IED etc. different internet search engines. Few news website that generally 
publish news on Kabul were searched for daily news achieves from 1st January 2006 to 31st 
December 2010. When any news papers mentioned any suicide attack on a particular day 
then further web searches was carried out for that day to extract more information of that 
incident for detailed information and confirmation. Many cases the news from different 
sources on same incident was contentious and mismatching with each other’s statement. 
News from local newspapers was given more priority than international news by 
considering scale of spatial information variation. Many news sources were considered for 
this study and followings are the main sources (but not limited to) of Suicide attack 
location information beyond limited number of confidential security reports.  
The List of Suicide Attack news sources:  
i. Pajhwok Afghan News: A Local News Website  (URL: www.pajhwok.com) 
ii. Tolo News: A Local News Website (URL: www.tolonews.com) 
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iii. The Afghanistan Ngo Safety Office (ANSO): an independent project to inform and 
advise humanitarian organizations on safety conditions across Afghanistan, 
established in 2002. (URL: http://www.afgnso.org)  
iv. BBC News: An International News Website (URL: www.bbc.co.uk ) 
v. Voice of America: An International News Website (URL: www.voanews.com.) 
vi. NYDailyNews: An International News Website (URL: www.nydailynews.com) 
vii. World Military Forum: International Military News (URL: www.armybase.us) 
viii. The guardian: An International News Website (URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ ) 
Primarily we found 69 suicide attack information on the above mentioned sources with 
different level of location description. Most of these suicide attacks, that were affected 
large number of people and was successful to reach the target, came to the public news 
bulletin. Evidence found for many suicide attacks that miscarried in many reasons like, 
missing the aim as detonated before reaching the target, or detonated during preparation at 
night or on the way mistakenly pressed the button for test etc. which affected only the 
attacker did not come to the news or received any attention. Moreover, the number of 
casualty and wounded never matched between two consecutive sources for same incident. 
In most cases number of affected people was provided based on assumption with range 
value and very few cases a controversial statement came from the government body. So, it 
was very difficult to do any detailed and reliable analysis on number of affected people. 
2.3.2 Data Categorization  
The study team primarily categorized the incident reports that were available on the web 
on the basis of attack techniques used for each of the explosive attacks. There were many 
types of attack in Kabul during the study period. The study categorized all the attack 
reports (for an example see Figure 11) on the basis of attack techniques. Two major 
suicide attack technique, Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device technique uses suicide 
vest to attack generally static targets in a building or in the crowd which is well known as 
BBIED and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device technique fills huge amount of 
explosives in a Car and used to chase or wait in the road to attack convoy of the target is 
well known as VBIED. There are different IED’s based attack techniques that often 
confuse the reader by using different term in different reports. Especially many reporters 
write BBIED or VBIED as simple IED and create semantic problem for automatic 
categorization. So, the author carefully read all the reports and description of incidents for 
correct categorization of IED based attacks in Kabul. Finally the study considered only 
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suicide attacks that were caused by BBIED and VBIED and removed all other IED based 
attack techniques like Remoter control IED, Road Side IED, IEDs made with Grenades etc. 
In case of multiple suicides attack occurred at same time or very little time difference then 
two factors was used to categories them. In case of complex attack, if multiple suicide 
attack happened at same time or within a few minutes difference and at a same place or 
within a distance of 200meter then it was considered as a single attack. But if the attack 
happened in different location (distance >~500meter) at similar time then it was considered 
as separate attack.  
2.3.3 Extraction of Spatial Information 
The study team extracted spatial information of suicide attack location that described in 
natural language in different incident reports. We had gone through all the reports in detail 
and marked the relevant information that required for the study. An example of a suicide 
attack report that published in an Afghan local news website named Pajhwok Afghan 
News (www.pajhwok.com) on 27th November 2008 is shown in Figure 11 where the 
relevant information required for the research are highlighted with yellow marks. The 
challenging part was to understand the name reference as many of them were in local 
aliases like in Dari or Pashto. Some location name was spelled differently in different 
news. Some were incomplete information and with incorrect reference location. We had 
compared information from different sources for authenticity and to extract complete 
information for correct geocoding.    
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Figure 11: Suicide Attack news published in Pajhwok Afghan News on 27.11.2008 
2.3.4 Suicide Attack Database 
In many cases the spatial reference information in one news paper was not sufficient to 
depict the location point on map. In that cases the information was accumulated from 
different sources to geocode the location point quite accurately (see Figure 12). This 
method also benefited the study by evaluating authenticity of published news in different 
sources for better interpretation of spatial knowledge and reaching to a better decision.  
The information displayed in Figure 12 is self explanatory except few aliases that used to 
fit the title in the small space.  The database fields were maintained some rules that are as 
follows:  
? Date: The date of the incident 
? Time_Specific: The time of incident when the suicide attack occurred  
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? Time_Range: many cases the incident report failed to state specific time and they 
use categorical time interval. In that case we add the linguistic value of time and 
interoperable option to convert it to specific average time or vice versa. The 
Morning- 6.00h to 9.00h, before noon - 9.01h to 12.00h, afternoon 12.1h to 
15.00h, evening 15.01h to 18.00h night 18.00h to 6h on next day.  
? Province: in which Province the suicide attack occurred. The attack must be 
occurred in Kabul province to enter in this database.  
? District: in which district the incident occurred among the 22 police district of 
Kabul municipal boundary.  
? Area_Name: name of the Area or community. 
? Street: name or number of the Street where incident occurred 
? Reference: landmarks or are names that described to refer location of incident.  
? X_Cor_Org: original X coordinate if stated in incident report 
? Y_Cor_Org: original Y coordinate if stated in incident report 
? Attack_Technique: which technique or method (weapon/explosive) was used for 
the attack 
? Intended_Target: who were intended target of the attack 
? Quality_of_Execution: how accurate was the incident to reach the target.  
o Target Missed: only civilian casualty or wounded 
o On the Target: only or maximum intended target casualty or wounded 
o Partially on the Target: both target and civilian casualty or wounded 
o Miscarriage: premature detonation - no harm to others. 
? Target People Killed: number of target people killed by the incident 
? Target People Wounded: number of target people wounded by the incident 
? Other People Killed: number of other people killed by the incident 
? Other People Wounded: number of other people wounded by the incident 
? Insurgents Killed: number of insurgents killed by the incident 
? Insurgents Wounded: number of insurgents wounded by the incident 
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? Estimated Time: inserted mean value of specified time range in case of missing 
specific time value for temporal analysis  
? Estimated X and Y coordinate: Generated X, Y Coordinate value for each 
incident by the research team (see Section 3.1 below).  
 
Figure 12: A database form showing extracted information on Suicide Attack of 
27.11.2008 
In many cases the suicide attack quality was described and on the target and showed photo 
affected target groups but could not give specific number of affected people from target 
group. So, that might be counted in the other people killed or wounded group as a mass.  
The complete suicide attack database as a form view is attached in Annex I.  
2.4 Target Group Establishment Points (TGEP) 
The location of government and international organizational establishment data collected 
from AIMS were categorized by incorporating local and international military 
establishments and appended in one shapefile and considered as “Target Group 
Establishment Points (TGEP)”. The list of considered national and international 
establishments is attached in Annex II.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Geocoding Suicide Attack Location Points 
3.1.1 Spatial Reasoning 
Almost all of the suicide attack reports were provided with a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative approximate spatial information of the incident location described in natural 
languages.  This research required to generate a point data from the descriptive news 
reports to use in spatial analysis. The suicide attack location points were generated from 
local knowledge and relative proximity from reference point location described in the news 
reports with considerations of approximate spatial reasoning techniques (Dutta, 1991) and 
qualitative distances (Hernandez et al., 1995). Figure 13 shows the process graphically.  
A. Method of Data Extraction   B. Method of Spatial Reasoning 
 
Figure 13: Method of data extraction and geocoding 
News Search
Identify Incident 
date
Further search for more 
information from different 
sources
Insert 
information to 
database
Mark Key 
Information Compare 
information from 
different sources
BBIED, VBIED, SIED, 
Suicide Attack etc. 
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3.1.2 Data Accuracy 
Some of the news reports provided with detailed descriptive spatial information pointing 
towards nearby landmarks which could be used to generate points with 5 to 10 meters of 
accuracy. But some spatial information was not detailed enough, either the geographic data 
of reference locations mentioned was unavailable or in some cases reference point was 
indicated with Persian name and spelling was not matching with the GIS data available to 
the team for geocoding at similar accuracy. The original location of those incidents may 
vary up to 500meter from the point that geocoded in the map. Primarily 69 suicide attack 
incidents information were captured from various sources (described in Section 2.3) but 
finally the team was successful to geocode 64 suicide attack location points within the 
study boundary to use for spatial analysis (Figure 14).   
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Figure 14: Major Suicide Attack Locations Occurred in Kabul City from 2006 to 2010. 
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3.2 Data Conversion and processing    
Spatial point pattern analysis of suicide attack location required to import 4 dataset in 
SPATSTAT package supported data formats from the original GIS data format (shapefile).  
The maps were produced in ArcGIS and spatial point pattern analysis done in SPATSTAT 
package (Baddeley and Turner, 2005; Baddeley 2008) of Software R.   
3.2.1 Create Observation Window from polygon shapefile 
Considering the implication of observation widow or frame of reference on point pattern 
analysis, the study area shapefile was created in ArcGIS software environment. The Study 
area covered only the urban settlement and nearby area where suicide attack can be 
occurred within vast Kabul municipal boundary (see Figure 14) to put emphasis on 
randomness of the suicide attack probability. The study area from shapefile format was 
converted to “SPATSTAT” following the techniques described by Baddeley (2011) in few 
steps.  
Step 1: Read shapefile using maptools 
Step 2: Detection of spatial object class 
Step 3: Converting data to SPATSTAT format 
Step 4: Declare polygon data as window  
3.2.2 Convert SALP data to SPATSTAT 
The Suicide Attack Location Points (SALP) which were primarily created in GIS file 
format (shapefile), converted to the SPATSTAT package of Software-R in few standard 
steps (Baddeley, 2011).   
Step 1: Read shapefile using maptools 
Step 2: Detection of spatial object class 
Step 3: Converting data to SPATSTAT format 
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Figure 15: Suicide Attack Location Points in the automatic data extent window 
 
Step 4: Apply Window from W="owin" Class 
Step 5: Unmark the Point data  
Step 4: Update Unit as Meter  
The primary data does not show any particular measurement unit and needed to 
declare appropriate measurement unit (meter for this data) for proper interpretation.  
Step 5: Changing Scale and Unit to Kilometer 
 Considering the fact of having only few numbers of suicide attack location points 
(64) within the study area, it was decided to round the measurement unit to 
kilometer for better understandable statistics. 
Step 6: Display SALP data   
 
* The grid distance units is in kilometer  
Figure 16: Suicide Attack Location Points in the City Habitat Window 
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3.2.3 Converting TGEP data to SPATSTAT 
The Target Group Establishment Point (TGEP) which were primarily created in GIS file 
format (shapefile), converted to the SPATSTAT package of “R” by similar steps that were 
followed in section 3.2.2. Only difference was to keep the embedded marks with the TGEP 
data which could differentiate government establishments from international 
establishments.  
3.3 Spatial Point Pattern Analysis  
The spatial point pattern analysis of this research carried out in 3 stages. Suicide attack 
location points (SALP) and target group establishment point (TGEP) were analyzed 
separately in two consecutive stages and explored spatial patterns. Finally it analyzed 
covariate effect whether the location of SALP depends on TGEP.  
3.3.1 Estimates of Spatial Pattern  
Both SALP and TGEP were analyzed separately by following methods. 
3.3.1.1 Test of Intensity 
First of all the point data were checked to decide whether they are uniform (constant) or 
non-uniform (inhomogeneous) by observing average density, quadrate count and kernel 
density methods.  
     Uniform         Inhomogeneous  
 
Figure 17: A sample of uniform and inhomogeneous point pattern 
Source: Baddeley (2008) 
3.3.1.2 Test of Interaction  
In this stage the point data were tested for complete spatial Randomness (CSR) test using 
Envelops over K function and G function to decide whether the data are random or there 
were some sort of interactions among those points. The Envelops established on the basis 
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of maximum and minimum values of K(r) or G(r) for each value of distance r(pairwise 
distance/ nearest neighbor distances) of some simulated realizations (100 simulation for 
our study) of CSR with same intensity. If the test result rejects the test of CSR then next 
step is to decide the nature of the pattern either regular or clustered (See Figure 18).  
If the simulated line of each observed value of distance variable r become greater than the 
theoretical value of K(r) or G(r) of CSR then the it is decided the point pattern as clustered 
or point located closely to each other. In case of observed K(r) or G(r) <  theoretical K(r) 
or G(r) then the pattern is decided as regular or dispersedly located from each other.  
Independent            Regular             Clustered  
 
Figure 18: A sample of different types of interaction pattern 
Source: Baddeley (2008) 
3.3.2 Analysis of Covariate Effects 
In this stage the study tried to check whether the intensity of suicide attack location points 
(SALP) depends on target groups establishment locations (TGEP) by Marked Point Pattern 
Analysis techniques described by Baddeley (2008) in his SPATSTAT manual.   
3.4 Justification of Accuracy Impact 
Some of the suicide attack location inherited with low accuracy, which varies up to 500 
meter. The study generated the suicide attack location points again by considering its 
possible positional error by moving the point to a different place arbitrarily within its error 
extent. The simulations were carried out again based on this new dataset and results were 
compared to draw the final inference of this study.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Introduction 
To fulfill the requirement of the general objective and three specific objects that aimed for 
the study we did point pattern analysis of the suicide attack location points and target 
group’s establishment points to revel spatial pattern of these two types of point’s location 
with respect to the Kabul city study boundary. Then we approached to reveal 
interdependency between suicide attacks location points and target group establishment 
location by marked point pattern analysis. Finally we esteemed to revel some spatial and 
temporal analysis considering other relevant spatial and social factors like, who are the 
targets of the suicide attacks, where the suicide attack happens mostly, what time, which 
months and which year how many suicide attack happened in Kabul from 2006 to 2010.    
4.2 Analysis of Suicide Attack Location Points (SALP) 
The study contained 64 major (excluding some miscarriage and unreported incidents) 
suicide attack location points that occurred in last 5 years from January 2006 to December 
2010 within the urban settlement limit of Kabul City.  
4.2.1 Investigation of Intensity 
Intensity is the average or mean value of points distributes in a single unit of the specified 
area. This value can determine whether the point pattern is uniform/constant or 
inhomogeneous over the space.   
4.2.1.1 Uniform Intensity  
The estimated average intensity of suicide attack points is 0.178 points per square 
kilometer. Now this value could be used as a parameter to prove these points distribution is 
homogeneous i.e. it exists same intensity in all parts of the study area or intensity varies 
over space for an inhomogeneous distribution. 
4.2.1.2 Inhomogeneous Intensity 
I. Quadratcount  
The study area was divided into 6 x 3 quadrate cells and measured the points in each of the 
quadrate to evaluate its intensity pattern and found the pattern is inhomogeneous (See 
Figure 19).  
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Figure 19: Intensity of suicide attack incident by 6x x 3y quadrates of the Kabul City 
It was also found that the central area experienced more suicide attacks than other areas 
though there were also some sort of linear patterns originated in the center and approached 
outwards (especially to the ease and west) the city which might followed some major 
roads. 
II. Kernel Density Estimation 
The kernel density estimation using an isotropic Gaussian kernel with a radius of 2 
kilometer (δ=2km) was implemented in SPATSTAT for SALP data. The result is 
presented in Figure 20, which strongly proved the dataset to be inhomogeneous pattern i.e. 
the distribution is not same in all parts of the city.  
Figure 20: Graduated color plot (left) and perspective view (right) of Kernel density 
of suicide attack location points in Kabul City with sigma = 2km 
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4.2.2 Investigation of Interaction 
The test of complete spatial randomness (CSR) was done by two distance based functions 
to decide whether the dataset is completely random or there exists some interaction 
between points. First we tested the nature of interaction by an envelope over pairwise 
distance (the K function) and then envelop over nearest neighbor distances function (the G 
function) with 100 simulated realization of CSR to decide the pattern to be completely 
random or not.  If the line of K-function or G function estimated from SALP lies outside 
the typical range value of K/G function for a completely random pattern then we would 
reject the data point pattern to be completely spatial random and approach towards 
deciding whether the data is clustered or regular pattern by observing whether the observed 
value of K/G function is greater or smaller than the typical theoretical value of CSR.   
4.2.2.1 Envelop for Pairwise distances and the K function:  
The outputs of the K function test for 100 simulated realization of CSR are as follows,  
Table 2: Result of Envelop over K Function for SALP 
Pointwise critical envelopes for K(r)  
Edge correction: “iso”  
Obtained from 100 simulations of CSR  
 
Significance level of pointwise Monte Carlo test: 2/101 = 0.0198  
 
Data: SALP  
Function value object (class ‘fv’) for the function r -> K(r)  
 
Entries: 
id       label      description 
--       -----       ----------- 
r        r           distance argument r 
obs      obs(r)     observed value of K(r) for data pattern 
theo     theo(r)    theoretical value of K(r) for CSR 
lo       lo(r)      lower pointwise envelope of K(r) from simulations 
hi       hi(r)      upper pointwise envelope of K(r) from simulations 
-------------------------------------- 
Default plot formula: 
        . ~ r 
Recommended range of argument r: [0, 5] 
Available range of argument r: [0, 5] 
Unit of length: 1 kilometer 
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Figure 21: Envelope for pairwise distances and the K function for SALP data 
A. Decision of Randomness  
The Observed line of K Function in Figure 21 lied completely outside of envelope, i.e. for 
every arguments of pairwise distances (r) which constructed an observed line that lied far 
away (significant difference) from the theoretical line of CSR and both of the upper and 
lower point-wise envelope limit of K(r) from 100 simulations of same intensity of points. 
Hence, according to the Monte Carlo test principals (Baddeley, 2008), we rejected the null 
hypothesis of the SALP point pattern to be random or independent pattern with high level 
of significance (Significance level of point-wise Monte Carlo test is 0.0198 or ~98% level 
of confidence). So, we can say the point data is either regular or clustered.  
B. Decision of Clustering or Regularity   
We also observed (in Figure 21) that for every argument of pairwise distance ´r´ the 
observed value of K(r) for the SALP data pattern are always greater than the theoretical 
value of K(r) of CSR. This indicates SALP data set as a clustered point pattern that means 
there exists some sort of interactions among the points. 
4.2.2.2 Envelop for nearest neighbour distances and the G function 
The results of the envelop over G function computations for the point-wise distances are as 
follows,  
  33
Table 3: Result of Envelop over G Function 
Point-wise critical envelopes for G(r)  
Edge correction: “km”  
Obtained from 100 simulations of CSR  
 
Significance level of point-wise Monte Carlo test: 2/101 = 0.0198 
  
Data: SALP  
Function value object (class ‘fv’) 
for the function r -> G(r)  
 
Entries: 
id      label     description 
--      -----     ----------- 
r       r         distance argument r 
obs     obs(r)    observed value of G(r) for data pattern 
theo    theo(r)   theoretical value of G(r) for CSR 
lo      lo(r)     lower pointwise envelope of G(r) from simulations 
hi      hi(r)     upper pointwise envelope of G(r) from simulations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Default plot formula: 
        . ~ r 
Recommended range of argument r: [0, 1.2775] 
  Available range of argument r: [0, 4.5422] 
Unit of length: 1 kilometer 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Envelope for G function test of SALP 
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A. Decision of Randomness  
The Observed line in Figure 22 lied completely outside of the envelope formed by 100 
simulated realizations of CSR with the same intensity, over G function graph. So, for every 
arguments of observed value of G(r) of the data pattern formed a line, that lied far away 
(significant distance) from the theoretical line of CSR and as well as outside of  both upper 
and lower point-wise envelope limit of G(r) of the 100 simulations. Hence, from the Monte 
Carlo test principles (Baddeley, 2008), we rejected the null hypothesis of being the SALP 
point pattern as random or independent pattern significantly (Table 3). So, at this stage it 
was decided that the data is not rand and it might be either regular or clustered.  
  
B. Decision of Clustering or Regularity  
For every argument of distance (r) for the observed value of G(r) were always greater than 
the theoretical value of G(r) of CSR (Figure 22). Thus the Suicide attack location point 
pattern is proved to be clustered.  
4.3 Analysis of Target Groups Establishment Points (TGEP)  
The study used 153 point location of government and International strategic establishments 
(building or compound) that seems to be targets of the suicide attack within the urban 
settlement limit (window area =360.32 km2) of Kabul City.  
4.3.1 Investigation of Intensity 
The study investigated the point pattern with the measure of intensity. It was carried out to 
decide whether the point pattern is homogeneous or inhomogeneous.  
4.3.1.1 Uniform Intensity 
It was found that the average intensity of target group establishments was 0.425 points per 
square kilometer. In case of homogeneous pattern, every corner of the study window 
should have similar number of establishment per unit area. If not then the pattern is not 
uniform. For this we had investigated inhomogeneous intensity.  
4.3.1.2 Inhomogeneous Intensity 
I. Quadratcount  
The study area was divided into 6 x 3 quadrate cells and measured the number of points in 
each of the quadrate to evaluate its intensity distribution and found the pattern is 
inhomogeneous (See Figure 23). It seems the target group establishments points are more 
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concentrated to the core of the city or central area compared to the suicide attack location 
distribution (visual comparison of Figure 19 and Figure 23).   
 
Figure 23: Intensity of target group establishments by 6 x 3 quadrates within the 
study window 
II. Kernel Density  
The kernel density estimation used isotropic Gaussian kernel with a radius of 2 kilometer 
(δ=2km) and implemented in SPATSTAT on TGEP data. The result is presented in 
Figure 24, which strongly proved the dataset as inhomogeneous pattern.  
 
  Figure 24: Graduate color plot and perspective plot of Kernel density of Target 
Group Establishment Point (TGEP) in Kabul City with sigma = 2km 
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4.3.2 Investigation of Interaction 
The investigations of interaction among the points were done by two distance based 
functions. First we tested the nature of interaction by an envelope over pairwise distance 
(the K function) and then envelop over nearest neighbor distances function (the G 
functions). 
4.3.2.1 Envelop for Pairwise distances and the K function 
The output of the K function test is illustrated in Table 4 below,  
Table 4: Result of Envelop over K Function for TGEP 
Point-wise critical envelopes for K(r)  
Edge correction: “iso”  
Obtained from 100 simulations of CSR  
 
Significance level of point-wise Monte Carlo test: 2/101 = 0.0198  
 
Data: TGEP  
Function value object (class ‘fv’) for the function r -> K(r)  
 
Entries: 
id      label     description 
--      -----     ----------- 
r       r         distance argument r 
obs     obs(r)    observed value of K(r) for data pattern 
theo    theo(r)   theoretical value of K(r) for CSR 
lo      lo(r)     lower point-wise envelope of K(r) from simulations 
hi      hi(r)     upper point-wise envelope of K(r) from simulations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Default plot formula: 
        . ~ r 
 
Recommended range of argument r: [0, 5] 
  Available range of argument r: [0, 5] 
Unit of length: 1 kilometer 
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Figure 25: Envelope for pairwise distances and the K function for TGEP data 
 
I. Decision of Randomness  
The observed line in Figure 25 lied completely outside of envelop, i.e. for every 
arguments of r that constructs an observed line laid far away (significant difference) from 
the theoretical line of CSR and both of the upper and lower point-wise envelope limit of 
K(r) from 100 simulated realization of CSR for distance r. Hence, from the principles of 
Monte Carlo test (Baddeley, 2008), we rejected the null hypothesis of being the TGEP 
point pattern as random or independent with high level of significance (significance level 
of point-wise Monte Carlo test: 2/101 = 0.0198 or ~98% level of confidence). So, the data 
is declared as either regular or clustered.  
II. Decision of Clustering or Regularity  
The (Figure 21) argument of distance (r) for the observed value of K(r) for data pattern are 
always greater than the theoretical value of K(r) of CSR. This indicates TGEP data set as a 
clustered point pattern that means there exists some sort of interactions among the points. 
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4.3.2.2 Envelop for nearest neighbour distances and the G function 
The results of the envelop over G function computations for the point-wise distances are 
illustrated in Table 5 below,  
Table 5: Result of Envelop over G Function for TGEP data 
Point-wise critical envelopes for G(r)  
Edge correction: “km”  
Obtained from 100 simulations of CSR  
Significance level of point-wise Monte Carlo test: 2/101 = 0.0198019801980198  
 
Data: TGEP  
Function value object (class ‘fv’) for the function r -> G(r)  
 
Entries: 
id      label     description 
--      -----     ----------- 
r       r         distance argument r 
obs     obs(r)    observed value of G(r) for data pattern 
theo    theo(r)   theoretical value of G(r) for CSR 
lo      lo(r)     lower point-wise envelope of G(r) from simulations 
hi      hi(r)     upper point-wise envelope of G(r) from simulations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Default plot formula: 
        . ~ r 
 
Recommended range of argument r: [0, 0.39017] 
  Available range of argument r: [0, 2.9378] 
Unit of length: 1 kilometer 
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Figure 26: Envelope for G function test of TGEP 
I. Decision of Randomness 
The observed line in Figure 26 was found completely outside of the envelope, created by 
100 simulated realizations of CSR with the same intensity, over G function graph. Hence, 
from the Monte Carlo test principles (Baddeley, 2008), we rejected the null hypothesis of 
being the TGEP point pattern as random or independent pattern significantly. So, at this 
stage it was decided that the data is either regular or clustered. 
II. Decision of Clustering or Regularity  
For every argument of ´r´ for the observed value of G(r) were always greater than the 
theoretical value of G(r) of CSR (Figure 26). Thus the Suicide attack location point pattern 
was proved as clustered.  
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4.4 Investigation of the Relationship between SAP and TGEP 
The previous investigation on suicide attack location points (SALP) and Target group 
establishment points (TGEP) separately revealed that both data pattern were 
inhomogeneous and clustered. So, Multitype (categorical marks) point pattern analyses 
were done to reveal inherent relationship or dependencies of SALP on TGEP. We also 
considered TGEP as covariate and SALP as dependent on the TGEP for our analysis.  
4.4.1 Creating dataset and Inspecting General Pattern 
One single point data file was created inserting all suicide attack location points marked as 
SALP and target group establishment points marked as TGEP as simple categorical label 
value. The summary function of SPATSTAT explored that there was total 217 points 
indicated as marked planar point pattern in the dataset where 64 points were marked as 
SALP and 153 point marked as TGEP. Figure 27 displayed the location of both TGEP and 
SALP within the study window where central part of the city looks clumsy due to high 
density of point.  
 
Figure 27: Simple plot of Suicide Attack Location Points and Target Group 
Establishment Point in SPATSTAT (the distance unit is Kilometer) 
4.4.2 Test of Intensity  
Intensity is the simplest and prime tool to explore point pattern. The summary function is 
SPATSTAT revealed that the average intensity was 0.602 point per square kilometer for 
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the combined point dataset (217 points consisting both SALP and TGEP) with respect to 
the study area window of 360.318 square kilometer. It also revealed that the mark SALP 
consisted 64 points which was 29.5% of the point population had an intensity of 0.178 
points/ km2 where TGEP consisted 153 points covered 70.5% of the point population with 
intensity of 0.425 points/km2. 
4.4.2.1 Intensity from comparative point plot    
We found the way of examining the sub-point pattern of different types separately quite 
sensible to avoid clumsy display by splitting marks and displayed points side by side (see 
Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28: Suicide Attack locations are placed beside Government and international 
Target locations 
The above side by side plot of points marked with SALP and TGEP in separate window 
given quite clear impression that, the target group establishments are highly concentrated 
in the core of the city, where suicide attack locations formed an interesting star or radial 
shape but they also focused at the center of the city. 
4.4.2.2 Intensity from comparative point density display    
In further, the side by side density plot of suicide attack location and target groups 
establishment locations separately reestablished our general idea on intensity and 
distribution pattern that concentrated in the city center (see Figure 29). In Addition, the 
density plot highlighted an interesting aspect of SALP pattern by displaying another small 
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area with high density of suicide attacks in the western side apart from its main 
concentration at the central part of the city.  
 
Figure 29: Comparative Intensity pattern of SALP and TGEP (distance unit is 
kilometer) 
 
The above figure have confirmed that the pattern of SALP and TGEP are inhomogeneous 
but still it demanded for some sort of statistics to quantify the combined intensity pattern.  
4.4.3 Test of Interaction 
The study had approached to reveal a concrete evidence of intensity pattern of Multitype 
points marked by SALP and TGEP by applying pairwise distances function (K function) 
and nearest neighbor distances function (G function).   
I. Nearest neighbor distances and the G function  
This function reveals that for any pair of type TGEP and SALP, the nearest neighbor 
distances Gts(r) considered as the distribution function of the distance from a point of type 
TGEP to the nearest point of type SALP (Baddeley, 2008 ). The basic assumptions for this 
test are:  
a. The Multitype point process ST is stationary. 
b. STs: denote the subtype of points of type SALP with intensity of λs 
c. STt denote the subtype of points of type TGEP with intensity of λt 
The depicted result of nearest neighbor distance function (G function) of distances from a 
target group establishment location point (TGEP) to suicide attack location point (SALP) 
merely proved that the point pattern was clustered (Figure 30). It explored that (in the 
Figure 30) the Kaplan-Meier estimate of Gcross["TGEP", "SALP"](r) are greater than 
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theoretical Poisson Gcross["TGEP", "SALP"](r), i.e. Gts(r)>1-exp(-λsπr2) (Baddeley, 
2008).  
 
   Legend 
 
Figure 30: G function of distances from TGEP to SALP 
 
So, the nearest neighbour distances function (G function) also proved the Multitype point 
pattern as dependent by rejecting the null hypothesis of being uniform Poisson process 
(CSR) and .independent (according to Baddeley, 2008, pp. 170).   
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II. Pairwise distances and the K function  
This function reveals that for any pair of type TGEP and SALP, the pairwise distances 
Kts(r) is 1/λs times the expected number of points of type SALP within a distance of r of a 
typical point of type TGEP (Baddeley, 2008 ). The basic assumptions for this test are:  
a. The Multitype point process ST is stationary. 
b. STs: denote the subtype of points of type SALP with intensity of λs 
c. STt denote the subtype of points of type TGEP with intensity of λt 
 
Legend 
 
Figure 31: K function of distances from TGEP to SALP 
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The result of pairwise distance function (K function) explored that (see Figure 31) the 
Ripley isotropic correction estimate of Kcross["TGEP", "SALP"](r) are greater than 
theoretical Poisson Kcross["TGEP", "SALP"](r), i.e. Kts(r)>πr2 (Baddeley, 2008).  
So, the the null hypothesis of being a point pattern as uniform Poisson process (CSR) and 
.independent pattern rejected (Baddeley, 2008, pp. 170). Thus, it proved the Multitype 
point pattern (TGEP-SALP) as dependent again.   
 
4.4.4 Exploration of Correlation 
The confirmation of clear dependency of suicide attack location points on target group 
establishment location points inspired the study to approach towards exploring nature of 
spatial relationship between these two types of spatial point data (Multitype spatial point). 
The pattern of relationship between SALP and TGEP explored by application of marked 
correlation function techniques for categorical marks (Multitype point pattern) (Baddeley, 
2008).   
It was assumed ST (SALP-TGEP) a stationary point process for measuring dependence 
between SALP and TGELP with distance factor (r) by “mark correlation function” ρf(r).  
The equation of mark correlation function adopted from the quation stated by Mr.. 
Baddeley as, 
ߩ݂ሺݎሻ ൌ Ε[௙ሺௌଵ,்ଶሻሿΕ[௙ሺௌሷ, ሷ் ሻሿ   …………… …………………….(Baderely, 2008). 
Where,  
? S1 and T1 are marks attached to two points process respectively as SALP and 
TGEP separated by a distance r 
? ሷܵ  ܽ݊݀  ሷܶ are independent realizations of the marginal distribution of marks. And 
? ƒis a function for Multitype point patters as f(S1,T1)=1{S1=T1} 
This correlation function ߩ݂ሺݎሻcan take only positive real value and not exactly alike the 
usual statistical correlation. Instead of showing high correlation by value 1, it would 
represent no correlation. 
The result of the correlation function for marked point pattern displayed in Figure 32 
revealed a nonlinear correlation between SALP and TGEP with distances. Still it was quite 
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clear that most of the suicide incidents occurred in close proximity of the target group’s 
establishment location (Figure 32). The degree of correlation declined with increase of 
distance between suicide attack location and target group establishment location. When the 
distance between a pair of points composed by a suicide attack location and a 
corresponding nearby target group establishment location approximately exceeds 
2.8kimometer then there would be negative correlation between that pair of points.  
 
Figure 32: Realization of mark correlation function between SALP and TGEP 
 
 
4.4.5 Summary of the Point Pattern Analysis  
The findings of spatial point pattern analysis of suicide attack location inspired us to draw 
some general spatial scenario in Kabul city.  
 
This spatial point pattern analysis, in support to three specific objective, results explored 
that, 
? There is a general tendency to locate Government administrative establishments in 
a cluster in the center of the Kabul city. 
 
? The location of International organizations also concentrated in the city center in a 
cluster.  
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? The suicide attack locations are little scattered compared to the pattern of target 
group establishment locations. But still their concentration is higher in the city 
centre and represents inhomogeneous and clustered pattern. 
? There is a nonlinear distance relationship between suicide attack location points 
and target group establishment location points, where maximum suicide attack 
occurs in close proximity of target group establishment location with higher degree 
of positive correlation.  
We hope the above findings of this research might be a base to continue further advanced 
spatial analysis on top of this for modelling suicide attack for inventing and introducing 
appropriate protective measures to save Kabul from such devastating incidences. 
 
4.5 Overall Suicide Attack Scenarios in Kabul  
It has been noticed that the news about only major suicide attacks that incurred high 
casualties were publicly available. Few interesting general observations about the suicide 
attack in Kabul city revealed from spatial analysis are described in this section.  
4.5.1 Who are the targets 
It is quite clear that maximum intended targets were mainly international military convoy 
and high profile government employees (see Table 6 and Figure 33). Some complex 
attacks (multiple suicide attacks in a group) were coordinated to target ministry buildings, 
foreign embassies, military bases and residents of high profile international employees. 
This thesis explored spatial dependence between suicide attack locations and location of 
target group’s establishments (offices/work places, residents and Military bases).  
Table 6: Target Group of Suicide Attack in Kabul 
Target Group  Number of Attack*  Attack Percentage  Rank 
International Military  29 45.31  1
National Defence and Security  11 17.19  2
Government Body  10 15.63  3
International Expatriate  5 7.81  4
Foreign Diplomatic Mission  4 6.25  5
Private Security Company  1 1.56  6
Unknown**  4 6.25   Not Applicable
Total Attack  64 100.00    
* The number of Suicide attack that were publicly available from the year 2006 to 2010.  
  48
**The unknown target has been removed from the ranking.   
 
Figure 33: Number of attack by target group 
4.5.2 How many suicide attacks happen in a month or a year 
Our study found total 69 suicide attack incidents description from different sources that 
occurred from January, 2006 to the December, 2010. It is interesting that not all the cases 
among these incidents were covered by all of the sources. International news sites only 
reported high number of casualties and attacks to the high profile groups. Local news 
media published suicide attack news with good quality spatial information and sometimes 
published some details about miscarriage or premature suicide attacks as well. So, it is very 
difficult to say exactly how many suicide attacks occurred within this period. On average 
more than one (1.15/month) suicide attack occurred in every month. But temporal choices 
for suicide attacks are not so smooth. Sometimes, in few months there were no attacks and 
suddenly Kabul experienced 3-4 days with consecutive attacks in a row. 
The Figure 34: Monthly Distribution of Suicide Attacks of years from 2006 to 2010.  
The Figure 35: Daily Distribution of Suicide attacks occurred in Kabul with respect of 
months of years from 2006 to 2010. We did not find any considerable variation on choice 
of weekdays for suicide attacks in Kabul. Only on Friday, which is holyday in 
Afghanistan, there has been little low frequency of suicide attacks.  
The Figure 36: Hourly Distribution with respect of week days of Suicide attacks occurred 
in Kabul from 2006 to 2010. It was found that morning time, when maximum people 
travels for work and all roads remain busy, is the most favorite time for the attackers to 
attack on target.   
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Figure 34: Monthly Distribution of Suicide Attacks of years from 2006 to 2010 
 
 
Figure 35: Daily Distribution of Suicide attacks occurred in Kabul with respect of 
months of years from 2006 to 2010 
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Figure 36: Hourly Distribution with respect of week days of Suicide attacks occurred 
in Kabul from 2006 to 2010 
 
4.5.3 Where the suicide attack happens 
Suicide attacks were happened in almost all parts of the city including very highly secured 
strategic points of Kabul city, except few completely residential areas and uninhabitable 
mountains (see Figure 14). Maximum suicide attack locations were found on the road 
which incurred higher number of civilian casualties than harm done to the target group 
(Annex: I). In many cases the attackers missed the target and did harm to the civilians only.  
Primarily it was difficult to understand the suicide attack concentration from a simple map 
like Figure 14. As repeated suicide attack in same location or close by points were going 
underneath of the point on top. So, we used event counting technique using 200meter 
snapping distance from each point location to aggregate nearby suicide attack locations 
within a distance of 200 meter and count the number of incidents. The result of the event 
count by snapping distance of 200meter of each suicide attack location are depicted in 
Figure 37 with graduated symbols sizes.  
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Figure 37: Repetition of suicide attacks by location 
The above map of repeated suicide attacks by location displayed the high and low 
concentration of suicide attack clearly. 
The point pattern analysis has given an expression of linear tendency of suicide attack 
locations which might follow few major roads. So, we selected all the road segments that 
experienced suicide attacks on or within a distance of 50meter and counted number of 
repeat incidents.  The result of quarry for on the road and nearby suicide attacks with 
number of repeat on same segment is displayed in Figure 24.  
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Figure 38: Repetition of suicide attacks by road segment  
 
The above figure displaying 4-5 road with very thick red line with 4 to 10 suicide attack in 
that segment within last 5 years. The thickest road to the east is the main road connected 
Jalalabad city with Kabul and which is also serves the purpose of Asian Highway to 
connect Pakistan, India and so on through Khaibar Pass as a route of business and 
communication.   
The result of previous analysis was interesting and demanded in-depth investigation to 
those hotspots. From the result of repeat suicide attack by location (Figure 37), we 
selected points where 3 or more suicide attacks occurred in last 5 years for further 
investigation. We found total 6 locations where 3 or more suicide attacks occurred within 
200meter snapping distance from each other. Then we drew 4 zone rectangles at a scale of 
1: 80,000 to 1: 130,000 depending upon spread of impact area and density to cover 
surroundings of 6 selected locations for identifying their nearby influence.  
The Figure 39 displaying one overview map of all repainting suicide attacks nearby for 3 
or more times in last 5 years. In the bottom there are 4 zone maps with corresponding 
scale, showing surrounding important structures.    
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                Figure 39: The zones of high influence for repeated attacks 
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Zone A is located in the heart of the city, where 7 suicide attacks occurred very close to 
many ministry building and presidential palace. The second red circle with 5 suicide attack 
is located in the middle of Indian Embassy and ministry of Interior and near to Safi 
Landmark international hotel.  
Zone B framed USA Embassy, USAID, Kabul International Airport and a military Camp 
beside the airport.  The red circle of 3 suicide attack is located in the middle of USA 
Embassy and Kabul international airport on the connecting road.  
Zone C covered the Jalalabad road which was indentified with thickest read line with 
highest number of suicide attack incident repeat within last 5 years (Figure 38). It was 
found that most of the national and international military camps are located beside this 
road. 5 United Nation’s department also located in a fortified compound also located 
nearby. The suicide attackers easily target the military convoy with VBIED in this road 
hiding in the crowd.   
The Zone D is located to the west of Kabul city outside of the city habitat containing a 
crowd of 4 repeated suicide attacks on a road leading towards Kandahar.  The close view 
explored that there is a road Bridge named Company Bridge which was used to trap the 
target convoy to execute successful suicide attack (Figure 39).   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
This research generated some important quantitative information which is a foundation to 
go one step forward to defend suicide attack in Kabul scientifically. There is a general 
tendency to locate Government administrative establishments in a cluster in the center of 
the Kabul city. The location of international organizations is also concentrated in the city 
center as a cluster. The suicide attack locations are little scattered compared to the pattern 
of target group establishment locations. But still their concentration is higher in the city 
center and represents inhomogeneous and clustered pattern. There is a nonlinear distance 
relationship between suicide attack location points and target group establishment location 
points, where maximum suicide attack occurs in close proximity of target group 
establishment location. It does not prove yet that specific suicide attack that is targeted to a 
specific group (particular government office or international office or military base etc.) is 
just adjacent to that group’s establishment points. 
 
The spatial and temporal analysis at the end explored some valuable information on suicide 
attacks in Kabul. The result and observation explained how a group of high profile targets 
attracts the suicide attackers to come nearby for successful attack. It identified some areas 
and specific road with high risk of suicide attacks and recommends to the citizen of Kabul 
to avoid those areas as much they can. It was also fund that morning hours from 7am to 9 
am are most dangerous for travelers. The risks of being affected by the suicide attack 
increases in case of travel through dangerous roads or pass through dangerous areas from 
7am to 9am.   
This research produced some important maps that could support the city planning authority 
of Kabul to describe complex consequences of suicide attacks that takes place over the 
space and time. The maps and described areas need more concentration for structural and 
strategic measures to defend suicide attacks and save public property and valuable lives.  
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5.2 Recommendation  
 
We have some recommendations for future work approach, some of them we felt necessary 
but could not manage within the stipulated time and some are our realization from study 
findings that could bring different kind of inference.  
i. Pattern analysis can be an aid to modeling suicide attacks and successful prediction 
ii. Particular suicide attack location could be paired with the location of corresponding 
establishment of the intended target for better outcome. But it needed more detail 
information on every incident.  
iii. Spatial choice analysis and modeling (why that particular location was selected by 
the attacker for that particular incident) considering multiple variables on spatial 
aspects of suicide location could be studied in advanced stage.     
iv. High density areas should be carefully considered in the city planning unit for 
introducing physical measures to improve security 
v. Network analysis could be interesting to find the weak points of the existing 
secured zones that might used by the attacker to penetrate inside the secured zone 
like the suicide attack on 15.08.2009 (See Annex I-6).  
vi. Measure of traffic density was very important for assessing risk level of any road 
for suicide attacks. 
vii. Distance from road intersection can be an interesting analysis, as it was found that 
many cases the suicide attacker waits for target prior of the attack to hit on the 
target at right moment during traffic congestion. So, nearby road connection and its 
profile analysis could be valuable.  
viii. High official and military convoy should avoid civilian crowd and should select 
alternative routes.  
ix. Afghan Government should take initiative to collect and preserve all the incident 
location point data with high accuracy GPS devices. 
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Suicide Attack Report Database
Spatial Analysis of Suicide Attack Incidences in Kabul City
ID: 1
Date: 19/12/2010
Time_Specific: 07:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 19
Area_Name: Pul‐e‐Charkhi
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
on Kabul‐Jalalabad highway, Pul‐e‐Charkhi 
area, outside the Kabul military training 
center, in the eastern part of capital Kabul
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Afghan National Army
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 5
Target people Wounded: 9
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 528855.33
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822312.5
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:00:00 AM
ID: 2
Date: 12/11/2010
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: 6
Area_Name: Darulaman Road
Street: Darulaman Road
Spatial 
Reference:
on the Darul Aman Road, Near an IM 
Installation;  at the same area where 
attack happened on 18 may 2010
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 1
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 511524.28
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3814578.48
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 01:30:00 PM
ID: 3
Date: 10/08/2010
Time_Specific: 11:55:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Taimani
Street: 9 Street
Spatial 
Reference:
In the Vicinity of a Private Security 
Company Villa, 9 Street, Taimani
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Private Security Company
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 514638.72
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822852.95
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:55:00 AM
Annex I-1
ID: 4
Date: 18/07/2010
Time_Specific: 11:55:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Macroryan 4
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
near to a clinic named Shino Zada, in 4 
Macrorayan, District 9
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed: 3
Other People Wounded: 20
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 518884.63
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821881.54
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:55:00 AM
ID: 5
Date: 02/06/2010
Time_Specific: 09:45:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Polytechnic University
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
few hundred meters to the south of the 
venue of National peace conference held 
at Polytechnic University, District 5
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Political People
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 511043.6
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820863.05
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:45:00 AM
ID: 6
Date: 29/05/2010
Time_Specific: 12:45:00 PM
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Inductrial/Commercial area on the Old 
Bagram Road
Street: Old kabul‐Bagram Road
Spatial 
Reference:
Outside of a military caterer. East of 
capital, close to supreme supermarket, 
within the Inductrial/Commercial area 
along Old kabul‐Bagram Road in vicinity of 
the ISAF's Camp Phoenix
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Unknown
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 522945.07
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822711.32
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 12:45:00 PM
ID: 7 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-2
Date: 18/05/2010
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 6
Area_Name: Darul Aman
Street: Darulaman Road
Spatial 
Reference:
on Darul Aman road, close to the Afghan 
National Army Counter Insurgency 
Academy, ANA Recruitment Center and 
two Ministries; north of Darul Aman 
Palace.
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed: 14
Other People Wounded: 45
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 511652.36
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3814811.82
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 8
Date: 26/02/2010
Time_Specific: 06:45:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Shar i Naw area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
Infront of Hamid guest house and Park 
Residence Hotel, near Safi Landmark Hotel 
(City Center Shopping Complex) at Share 
Naw
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Indian Nationals, embassy officials
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 9
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 8
Other People Wounded: 38
Insurgents killed: 5
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515238.58
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821195.35
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 06:45:00 AM
ID: 9
Date: 18/01/2010
Time_Specific: 09:45:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Pashtunistan Square, Malik Aghar Square 
and Cinema Pamir area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
1 PBIED near the entrance to the 
Presidential Palace; near Pashtunistan 
Square; 2 PBIED inside Feroshgah Market
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Presidential Palace, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Finance and the Afghanistan 
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 4
Target people Wounded: 28
Other People Killed: 4
Other People Wounded: 28
Insurgents killed: 6
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516527.04
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819853.65
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:45:00 AM
ID: 10 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-3
Date: 18/01/2010
Time_Specific: 11:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Malik Aghar Square
Street: Malik Aghar Square
Spatial 
Reference:
at the Malik Aghar Square, in front of the 
Gulbahar Centre and close to the Ministry 
of Education
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Ministry of Education
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 3
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 515964.92
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820082.81
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:30:00 AM
ID: 11
Date: 15/12/2009
Time_Specific: 10:50:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 10
Area_Name: Wazir Akbar Khan area
Street: corner of 14th and 8th Street
Spatial 
Reference:
Corner of 14th street  and Lane 8, in front 
of Heetal Hotel, in Wazir Akbar Khan area
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Hotel
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 5
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 10
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516605.72
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821984.91
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:50:00 AM
ID: 12
Date: 28/10/2009
Time_Specific: 06:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Shar‐i‐Naw locality
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
Bakhtar guest house, at Shar‐i‐Naw locality 
of Kabul city
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: UN Guest House
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 5
Target people Wounded: 7
Other People Killed: 3
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 3
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515531.89
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820988.7
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 06:00:00 AM
ID: 13 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-4
Date: 08/10/2009
Time_Specific: 08:27:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Sher I Naw
Street: Interrior Ministry Street
Spatial 
Reference:
outside wall of the embassy, in front of 
the Indian embassy, on Interrior Ministry 
Street
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Indian Embassy, Kabul
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 15
Other People Wounded: 63
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 515153.13
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820766.1
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:27:00 AM
ID: 14
Date: 17/09/2009
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Bibi Mahro Area
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
on Kabul's airport road,  about 1.5 
kilometres (one mile) from the US 
embassy gates, at Bibi Mahro area.
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded: 4
Other People Killed: 10
Other People Wounded: 12
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 518265.77
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822571.63
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 01:30:00 PM
ID: 15
Date: 08/09/2009
Time_Specific: 08:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Kabul Airport
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
Near the Entrance of the Kabul Military 
Airport, at the eastern entrance of Kabul 
International Airport.
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 4
Other People Wounded: 14
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 519944.04
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3823902.45
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:30:00 AM
ID: 16 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-5
Date: 18/08/2009
Time_Specific: 01:00:00 PM
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Camp Phoenix Area
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
Camp Phoenix Area, District 9, on the 
Jalalabad road, east of Kabul
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed: 7
Other People Wounded: 50
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 523430.49
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822504.64
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 01:00:00 PM
ID: 17
Date: 15/08/2009
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 10
Area_Name: Shash Darak
Street: Street between US Embassy and 
Presidential Palace
Spatial 
Reference:
outside the Nato headquarters, next to 
the US embassy, in the same street as the 
presidential palace.
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: NATO Headquarter
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 7
Other People Wounded: 91
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 517132.84
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820811.19
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 18
Date: 19/04/2009
Time_Specific:
Time_Range:
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: outside Camp Souter, Jalalabad Road
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
outside Camp Souter, Jalalabad Road
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 521482.46
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822532.52
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 12:00:00 PM
ID: 19 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-6
Date: 15/03/2009
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Kampany locality, Lisa Kashif Area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
in front of a school in Kampany locality, 
Lisa Kashif Area, District 5, southwest of 
Kabul city
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Unknown
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 14
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 504756.74
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820090.08
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:30:00 AM
ID: 20
Date: 11/02/2009
Time_Specific: 10:10:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 11
Area_Name: Lab‐e‐Jar, in Khairkhana
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
at the entrance gate and inside of the 
building of the Prison Directorate, Lab‐e‐
Jar Area, in Khairkhana
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Building of the Prison Directorate
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded: 29
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 2
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 513402.12
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3824750.51
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:10:00 AM
ID: 21
Date: 11/02/2009
Time_Specific: 10:20:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Malik Asghar Square
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
at the gate of Ministry of Education
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Ministry of Education
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515943.97
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820036.41
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:20:00 AM
ID: 22 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-7
Date: 11/02/2009
Time_Specific: 10:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Pashtonistan Square
Street: Pashtonistan Square
Spatial 
Reference:
Inside the premises of the Ministry of 
Justice, near Pashtonistan Square, District 
2
Attack_Technique: Gun Fight and BBIED
Intended_Target: Ministry of Justice
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 8
Insurgents killed: 4
Insurgents Wounded: 1
X Coordinate: 516492.53
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819779.94
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:30:00 AM
ID: 23
Date: 01/02/2009
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Company area
Street: Kabul‐Ghazni Highway
Spatial 
Reference:
on Kabul‐Ghazni Highway, near Company 
Bridge
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 504140.84
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819817.59
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:30:00 AM
ID: 24
Date: 17/01/2009
Time_Specific: 09:50:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 10
Area_Name: Wazir Akbar Khan
Street: 15th Street
Spatial 
Reference:
at Zanbaq intersection, near German 
embassy, Camp Eggers of coalition forces
and United Nations Mine Action Center for 
Afghanistan (UNMACA)
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 6
Other People Killed: 3
Other People Wounded: 14
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516353.03
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820952.77
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:50:00 AM
ID: 25 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-8
Date: 30/11/2008
Time_Specific: 02:30:00 PM
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: 7
Area_Name: Darul‐Aman road
Street: Darulaman Road
Spatial 
Reference:
near Habibia high school, on
Darul‐Aman road (road to the Afghan 
parliament)
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Diplomatic convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 3
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 513520.81
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3817864.11
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 02:30:00 PM
ID: 26
Date: 27/11/2008
Time_Specific: 08:15:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Micro Ryan 3
Street: Street between Abdul Haq and Massoud 
squares
Spatial 
Reference:
between Abdul Haq and Massoud squares 
about 40 meters (yards) from the entrance 
of the US embassy, in front of block No: 
103 of Micro Ryan residential flats No: 3.
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 4
Other People Wounded: 17
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 517729.86
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821638.73
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:15:00 AM
ID: 27
Date: 30/10/2008
Time_Specific: 10:40:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 1
Area_Name: Ministry of Information and Culture
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
in the international meeting room on the 
first floor of the offices of the Ministry of 
Information and Culture
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Ministry of Information and Culture
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 5
Target people Wounded: 10
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516036.04
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819766.73
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:40:00 AM
ID: 28 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-9
Date: 30/08/2008
Time_Specific: 11:05:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: Paghman District
Area_Name: Qala‐e Haidar Khan Area
Street: Paghman highway
Spatial 
Reference:
On the paghman highway of Qala‐e Haidar 
Khan Area, Paghman
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 500770.01
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822394.72
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:05:00 AM
ID: 29
Date: 11/08/2008
Time_Specific: 04:30:00 PM
Time_Range: Evening
Province: kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Paktia Kot area
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
Paktia Kot area, on Jalalabad Road,  of 
eastern part of Kabul city, Within District 9
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed: 3
Other People Wounded: 17
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 526129.2
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822415
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 04:30:00 PM
ID: 30
Date: 22/07/2008
Time_Specific: 06:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 7
Area_Name: Bagh‐e‐Babar/ Babur's Garden
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
outside of the boundary of Bagh‐e‐Babar
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Afghan National Army Bus
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 5
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 514308.04
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3817771.25
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 06:30:00 AM
ID: 31 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-10
Date: 07/07/2008
Time_Specific: 08:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Shar e Naw
Street: Street between Ministry of Interior and 
Indian Embassy
Spatial 
Reference:
In front of Indian Embassy gate at Shar e 
Naw
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Indian Embassy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 38
Other People Wounded: 141
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 515145.22
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820771.47
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:30:00 AM
ID: 32
Date: 29/05/2008
Time_Specific: 08:20:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 12
Area_Name: Pul‐i‐Charkhi
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
near the Pul‐i‐Charkhi Jail, near the Pul‐i‐
Charkhi neighbourhood, on the eastern 
outskirt of Kabul;  between Zanabad and 
Qala Wazir areas;
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed: 3
Other People Wounded: 12
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 529061.72
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820594.46
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:20:00 AM
ID: 33
Date: 08/05/2008
Time_Specific: 05:45:00 PM
Time_Range: Evening
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Niaz Beg or Fazel Big
Street: Niaz Beg or Fazel Big
Spatial 
Reference:
Niaz Beg or Fazel Big
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 5
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 507925.53
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819934.21
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 05:45:00 PM
ID: 34 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-11
Date: 13/03/2008
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Qali Wakil
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
near the Kabul International Airport
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 4
Other People Killed: 6
Other People Wounded: 20
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 518570.69
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3823039.7
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 35
Date: 31/01/2008
Time_Specific: 07:20:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Taimani neighborhood
Street: road between Taimani and Sarsabzi 
squares
Spatial 
Reference:
on the road between Taimani and Sarsabzi 
squares
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Afghan National Army Bus
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 513977.33
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822894.1
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:20:00 AM
ID: 36
Date: 14/01/2008
Time_Specific: 06:15:00 PM
Time_Range: Night
Province: kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Faroshgah
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
at Serena Hotel, Faroshgah 
neighbourhood, Kabul City
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Hotel
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 4
Target people Wounded: 6
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 2
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516313.21
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819890.88
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 06:15:00 PM
ID: 37 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-12
Date: 05/12/2007
Time_Specific: 07:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 7
Area_Name: Chehilsutoon/ Takhnikam
Street: Takhnikam road
Spatial 
Reference:
on Takhnikum road, at Chehilsutoon area, 
within District 7
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Afghan National Army Passenger
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded: 7
Other People Killed: 7
Other People Wounded: 10
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 514122
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3814929.5
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:00:00 AM
ID: 38
Date: 04/12/2007
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Qala‐i‐Wakil
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
close to the Kabul International Airport, at 
Qala‐i‐Wakil area, within District 9
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy and ANA Bus
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 10
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 518544.85
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822993.94
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:30:00 AM
ID: 39
Date: 27/11/2007
Time_Specific: 07:40:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 10
Area_Name: Wazir Akbar Khan
Street: Street 14
Spatial 
Reference:
close to a mosque on the 14th Road, at 
Wazir Akbar Khan area, within District 10
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 4
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 516677.95
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821559.75
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:40:00 AM
ID: 40 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-13
Date: 24/11/2007
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: Paghman District
Area_Name: Chashma Bulbul
Street: Istahkaam Bridge
Spatial 
Reference:
Istahkaam Bridge, Chashma Bulbul area of 
Paghman
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed: 7
Other People Wounded: 15
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate:
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate:
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:30:00 AM
ID: 41
Date: 06/10/2007
Time_Specific: 08:10:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Airport Road
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
on the road leading to Kabul International 
Airport
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded: 8
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 518729.55
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3823279.96
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:10:00 AM
ID: 42
Date: 02/10/2007
Time_Specific: 07:10:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Char Rahi Qambar
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
Char Rahi Qambar area in the western 
part of the city
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: ANP
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 6
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 5
Other People Wounded: 8
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 507289.58
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820758.02
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:10:00 AM
ID: 43 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-14
Date: 29/09/2007
Time_Specific: 06:40:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Baharistan Cinema
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
opposite of the Baharistan Cinema, District 
2
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Afghan National Army Bus
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 28
Target people Wounded: 21
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 513248.67
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821170.96
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 06:40:00 AM
ID: 44
Date: 21/09/2007
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Company area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
near the Company Bridge in district 5, East 
of kabul; same area of the blast on 16 June 
2007 in Kabul
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 5
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 504186.69
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819837.01
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:30:00 AM
ID: 45
Date: 31/08/2007
Time_Specific: 07:33:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Kabul International Airport
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
Entrance to the Kabul International 
Airport; in front of the airport gate
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy and ANA
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded: 7
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 8
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 519058.68
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3823784.16
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 07:33:00 AM
ID: 46 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-15
Date: 31/07/2007
Time_Specific: 09:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Hutkhel
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
In the vicinity of Camp Phoenix on the 
Jalalabad road, Hutkhel area, within 
District 9
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 523310.24
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822500.95
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:00:00 AM
ID: 47
Date: 18/07/2007
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Company Bridge
Street: Main Ghazni  Road
Spatial 
Reference:
near Company Bridge on the main Ghazni  
Road
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 1
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 504121.46
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819811.67
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 48
Date: 06/07/2007
Time_Specific: 01:00:00 PM
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: Deh Sabz district
Area_Name: Khwaja Zanboor Wali mausoleum
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
near the Khwaja Zanboor Wali 
mausoleum, east of the capital, in Deh 
Sabz district of Kabul
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate:
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate:
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 01:00:00 PM
ID: 49 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-16
Date: 28/06/2007
Time_Specific: 09:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 12
Area_Name: Arzan Qimat
Street: road that leads to the Puli Charkhi Prison
Spatial 
Reference:
on the road that leads to the Puli Charkhi 
Prison District 12,  Arzan Qimat Area; 
Ahmad Shah Baba Mena on the eastern 
outskirts of Kabul
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: American Contractor
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 528991.27
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821098.46
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:00:00 AM
ID: 50
Date: 17/06/2007
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Police HQ
Street: on route to the police academy
Spatial 
Reference:
at District 2, near Police HQ in Kabul
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: ANP
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 22
Target people Wounded: 46
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 5
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515782.52
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820223.41
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 51
Date: 16/06/2007
Time_Specific: 08:45:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Company area
Street: Kabul‐Wardak‐Kandahar Highway
Spatial 
Reference:
on the main Wardak Highway, Company 
area, west of kabul City
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed: 4
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 504202.43
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819845.15
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:45:00 AM
ID: 52 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-17
Date: 23/05/2007
Time_Specific: 08:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Yakatoot Area
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
on Jalalabad Road, at Yakatoot Area, 
District 9
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: ANP (police contingent)
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 4
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 520236.46
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822131.05
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:30:00 AM
ID: 53
Date: 06/04/2007
Time_Specific:
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 3
Area_Name: Serai Alauddin area
Street: Darulaman Road
Spatial 
Reference:
on Darulaman Road, in the Serai Alauddin 
area,  of District 3
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: ANP
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 5
Other People Wounded: 4
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 513749.5
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3818242.8
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 54
Date: 28/03/2007
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 2
Area_Name: Joi Sher
Street: Aasmayee road
Spatial 
Reference:
on Aasmayee road, in the Joi Sher locality, 
District 2
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: NDS
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 5
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515452.96
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3819366.09
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 55 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-18
Date: 19/03/2007
Time_Specific: 09:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Yaka Toot
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
in the Yaka Toot locality, east of the city, 
on Kabul ‐ Jalalabad highway
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: US Embassy Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 1
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded: 3
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 520159.14
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822111.43
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:00:00 AM
ID: 56
Date: 21/01/2007
Time_Specific: 02:10:00 PM
Time_Range: Afternoon
Province: Kabul
District: Char Asiab district
Area_Name: Kabul ‐ Gardez Highway
Street: Kabul ‐ Gardez Highway
Spatial 
Reference:
in Char Asiab district of Kabul, on the 
Kabul ‐ Gardez Highway, some 15 
kilometres south of Kabul
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate:
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate:
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 02:10:00 PM
ID: 57
Date: 22/12/2006
Time_Specific: 10:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 8
Area_Name: Shah Shaheed area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
near the Shah Shaheed area, some 150 
metres away from Karta‐i‐Naw, within 
District 8
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Member of Parlament
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 518665.64
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3818828.98
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:00:00 AM
ID: 58 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
Annex I-19
Date: 16/10/2006
Time_Specific: 11:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Qala‐i‐Khayat, Bibi Mahro area
Street: Airport Road
Spatial 
Reference:
in the Qala‐i‐Khayat area and Bibi Mahro 
area, on the Kabul airport road. near the 
school
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Unknown
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 518319.13
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822650.22
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:30:00 AM
ID: 59
Date: 02/10/2006
Time_Specific: 10:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Banayee
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
in the Banayee area, east of the city, on 
Kabul‐Jalalabad road
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 3
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 519071.52
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821678.31
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:00:00 AM
ID: 60
Date: 30/09/2006
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 4
Area_Name: Shar‐i‐Naw >Pejantoon Area
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
at the third gate (west gate) of Ministry of 
Interior building, Shar‐i‐Naw
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: Ministry of Interior Building
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 12
Target people Wounded: 16
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 515210.35
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820728.1
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 61 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
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Date: 18/09/2006
Time_Specific: 05:30:00 PM
Time_Range: Evening
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Hodkhel ~ Uhd Kheyl area
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
Kabul city, District 9, Uhd Kheyl, Jalalabad 
Road, near Camp Phoenix and about 1 km 
west of the UNOCA compound
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: ANP
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 3
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed: 4
Other People Wounded: 8
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 524588.41
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822469.01
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 05:30:00 PM
ID: 62
Date: 17/09/2006
Time_Specific: 03:30:00 PM
Time_Range: Evening
Province: Kabul
District: 12
Area_Name: Medium Wave area, Puli Charkhi area
Street: On a dirt road that leads toward the 
Central Prison of Pulicharkhi
Spatial 
Reference:
Kabul city, District 12, Medium Wave area, 
Puli Charkhi area, north of Kabul Jalalabad 
road, on a dirt road that leads toward the 
Central Prison of Pulicharkhi
Attack_Technique: BBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded: 2
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 529755.49
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820206.54
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 03:30:00 PM
ID: 63
Date: 08/09/2006
Time_Specific: 10:45:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 10
Area_Name: Massoud Roundabout, 3rd Macro Ryan
Street: Street between Abdul Haq and Massoud 
squares
Spatial 
Reference:
quite opposite to 29 Block of the 3rd 
Macro Ryan; about 100 metres of 
American embassy; 20 metres of Massoud 
Roundabout
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 3
Target people Wounded: 13
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 29
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 517801.16
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821602.35
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:45:00 AM
ID: 64 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
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Date: 04/09/2006
Time_Specific: 10:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Yaka Toot area, Qali Wazir
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
Yaka Toot area, Qali Wazir,
on Kabul‐Jalalabad road
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: On the Target
Target People Killed: 1
Target people Wounded: 3
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded: 4
Insurgents killed: 2
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: 520258.3
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822143.97
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:30:00 AM
ID: 65
Date: 02/08/2006
Time_Specific: 08:00:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: 8
Area_Name: Sangai Naweshta
Street: Kabul‐Logar main road
Spatial 
Reference:
Kabul‐Logar main road, near Sangai 
Naweshta area, within District 8
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Unknown
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate:
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate:
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:00:00 AM
ID: 66
Date: 21/05/2006
Time_Specific: 11:15:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 9
Area_Name: Ud Kheyl Village Area (Jalalabad Road)
Street: Kabul‐Jalalabad highway
Spatial 
Reference:
in the area of Camp Phoenix, Near Hoot 
Kheil Bazar, Ud Kheyl Village Area 
(Jalalabad Road)
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 2
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 524255.44
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3822484.45
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 11:15:00 AM
ID: 67 X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
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Date: 02/05/2006
Time_Specific: 08:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Morning
Province: Kabul
District: Deh Sabz District
Area_Name: Shineh area
Street: Bagram‐Kabul road (new road)
Spatial 
Reference:
on Bagram‐Kabul road (new road), in the 
Bakhtiaran area, Shineh area, Deh Sabz 
District
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: International Military Convoy
Quality_of_Execution: Target Missed
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 1
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate:
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate:
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 08:30:00 AM
ID: 68
Date: 12/03/2006
Time_Specific: 09:30:00 AM
Time_Range: Beforenoon
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Polytechnic University
Street: Kabul‐Qargah Road
Spatial 
Reference:
in front of Polytechnic University, near 
Police Academy, on the main road 
between Kabul and Qargah, west of Kabul 
city
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Member of Parlament
Quality_of_Execution: Partially on the Target
Target People Killed: 2
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed: 2
Other People Wounded: 4
Insurgents killed: 2
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 510932.78
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3821144.46
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 09:30:00 AM
ID: 69
Date: 09/01/2006
Time_Specific: 10:30:00 PM
Time_Range: Night
Province: Kabul
District: 5
Area_Name: Niaz Baig
Street:
Spatial 
Reference:
in Niaz Baig, west of the city
Attack_Technique: VBIED
Intended_Target: Unknown
Quality_of_Execution: Miscarriage
Target People Killed:
Target people Wounded:
Other People Killed:
Other People Wounded:
Insurgents killed: 1
Insurgents Wounded:
X Coordinate: Y Coordinate:
X Coordinate: 508289.82
Estimated Coordinate (WGS1984‐UTM42N) :
Y Coordinate: 3820043.74
Estimated Information :
Estimated Time: 10:30:00 PM
Annex I-23
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ANNEX II 
 
 
Name of Government Institutes Considered for Analysis   
Ministry‐Agriculture 
Ministry‐Border and Tribal Affa 
Ministry‐Transportation 
Ministry‐Communication 
Ministry‐Commerce 
Ministry‐Defence 
Ministry‐Education 
Ministry‐Finance 
Ministry‐Foreign Affairs 
Ministry‐Haj (Pilgrimage) 
Ministry‐Higher Education 
Ministry‐Information and Cultur 
Ministry‐Interior 
Ministry‐Justice 
Ministry‐Martyrs and Disabled 
Ministry‐Economics 
Ministry‐Public Health 
Ministry‐Public Works 
Ministry‐Mines and Industeries 
Ministry‐Rural and Rehabilitati 
Ministry‐Labour and Social Affa 
Ministry‐Urban Development 
Ministry‐Women's Affairs 
Palace‐Presidential Palace 
Department‐Traffic 
Supreme Court‐Chief Justice 
Department‐Fire Station 
Ministry‐Anti Narcotics 
Ministry‐Energy 
Ministry‐Refugee Repatriation 
Department‐Geological Survey 
Department‐Central Statistic Offi 
Department‐AGCHO 
Department‐Academy of Science 
Department‐Kabul Municipality 
Department‐Passport Office 
VPO‐Vice Presedent Office 
Department‐Islahate Edari 
Ministry‐Youth 
Department‐Afghan Tourist Organization 
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Department‐Afgan Independent Human Rights Commission 
Kabul Military Academy 
Pul e Charkhi Prison 
Polica Academy 
National Military Academy 
 
Name of Government Institutes Considered for Analysis   
NAME  TYPE 
NRC  INGO 
Concern  INGO 
ANCB  INGO 
Swiss Peace  INGO 
ACBAR  INGO 
ACHR  INGO 
ActionAid  INGO 
Caritas_Germany  INGO 
DACAAR  INGO 
GAA  INGO 
HI  INGO 
HNI  INGO 
INTERSOS  INGO 
ISRA  INGO 
JEN  INGO 
Madera  INGO 
MCI  INGO 
Medair  INGO 
NAC  INGO 
Oxfam(GB)  INGO 
SNI  INGO 
Solidarites  INGO 
SCA  INGO 
TDH  INGO 
UMCOR  INGO 
AERO  INGO 
SOZO  INGO 
CoAR  INGO 
COOPI  INGO 
ACF  INGO 
AKDN/FHA  INGO 
FRCRCS  INGO 
IMC  INGO 
IRC  INGO 
AINA  INGO 
UNAMA  United Nations 
UNICEF  United Nations 
UNOPS  United Nations 
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UNV  United Nations 
DDR  United Nations 
AIMS  United Nations 
FAO/ILO  United Nations 
UNESCO  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations 
UNIFEM  United Nations 
UNODCP  United Nations 
UNAMA Pillar2  United Nations 
WFP  United Nations 
UNMACA  United Nations 
UNHCR  United Nations 
WHO  United Nations 
UNFPA  United Nations 
World Bank  Int‐Organization 
IOM  Int‐Organization 
CRS  INGO 
ICRC  Int‐Organization 
CARE  INGO 
MCPA  INGO 
ACTED  INGO 
AKDN  INGO 
USAID  Int‐Organization 
AREU  INGO 
RI  INGO 
IAM  INGO 
SC‐S  INGO 
SC‐UK  INGO 
AREA  INGO 
Afghan Aid  INGO 
ADA  INGO 
AMI  INGO 
CHA  INGO 
Germany  Embassy 
Libya  Embassy 
Bulgaria  Embassy 
Japan  Embassy 
France  Embassy 
UAE  Embassy 
Turkey  Embassy 
Iran  Embassy 
China  Embassy 
Neitherland  Embassy 
India  Embassy 
Pakistan  Embassy 
Suadia Arabia  Embassy 
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USA  Embassy 
Russia  Embassy 
Canada  Embassy 
IFRC  Int‐Organization 
EC  Int‐Organization 
ADB  Int‐Organization 
MSH  INGO 
Uzbekistan  Embassy 
Tajikistan  Embassy 
Camp Phoenix  International Military Camp 
Camp Souter  International Military Camp 
Military Area  International Military Camp 
Camp Invicta  International Military Camp 
Camp Warehouse   International Military Camp 
ISAF HQ  International Military Camp 
Camp Eggers  International Military Camp 
Safi Landmark  Int. Hotel 
Park Palace  Int. Hotel 
Heetal Hotel  Int. Hotel 
Serena Hotel  Int. Hotel 
IMF  International Military Camp 
Hotel Park  Int. Hotel 
Hotel Intercon  Int. Hotel 
Kabul Airport  Kabul International Airport  
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